Nonconceptual Contents in Kant´s Philosophy

Pedro Stepanenko


The aim of this paper is to compare two ways of understanding the differencebetween intuitions and concepts in order to inquire whether it make senseto talk of nonconceptual content in Kant’s philosophy. These two ways ofunderstanding this difference is the one Efraín Lazos supports in his 2014book (pp. 19-60) and mine in several publications (2000, 2008, 2011,2012). According to Lazos, kantian intuitions have nonconceptual content.According to me, kantian intuitions represent something or have contentonly when they are synthesized by means of concepts and in that sense theircontent is always conceptual.

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